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AS A NEGATIVE RIGHT, ARTICLE 25 CAN HAVE A
POSITIVE EFFECT COMBATING JAPAN’S POVERTY
Amelia S. Kegan†
Abstract: Article 25 of the Showa Constitution guarantees everyone in Japan a
minimum standard of “wholesome and cultured living.” Contrary to the force originally
envisioned by the Constitution’s framers, the Supreme Court of Japan has interpreted the
provision as merely a programmatic declaration that guides the legislature rather than as
an enforceable right under which an individual may sue. As a result, individuals cannot
seek relief from the judiciary for Article 25 violations. The Supreme Court should
recognize Article 25 also as a negative, concrete right, allowing individuals to seek
judicial relief when the government fails to appropriately apply laws intended to promote
the public’s ability to maintain a “minimum standard of living.”

I.

INTRODUCTION

An impoverished man is sick, unable to work, and in desperate need
of a doctor. Although a Japanese law mandates that everyone carry health
insurance, the man cannot afford the government premiums, and the public
official who operates the insurance program refuses to reduce or exempt the
premium levels for anyone in a constant state of poverty. The man’s
indigence and the official’s actions prevent the man from complying with the
law; he looks to the Constitution for help. A provision guarantees everyone
the right to a minimum standard of living, yet the judiciary denies such
claims even when the State actively prevents individuals from obtaining that
constitutionally guaranteed right.
Article 25 of the Showa Constitution, Japan’s constitution since 1946,
states, “(1) All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum
standards of wholesome and cultured living [“Minimum Standards Clause”].
(2) In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion
and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health
[“Promotions Clause”].”1 Despite this constitutional protection, the State
prevents people from maintaining a minimum standard of living, and
individuals are left without recourse.
†
The author would like to thank Ron Hjorth for his advice and guidance, Rob Britt for his
assistance locating Japanese materials, and Dan Foote for his early review and suggestions for further
research. The author especially would like to thank Bradley Bashaw, Luke Campbell, Ray Liaw, and in
particular Karen Clevering for the countless hours they spent editing drafts and their strong support
throughout the writing process. Any errors or omissions are the author’s own.
1
KENPŌ, art. 25, available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s3 (alterations
added).
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Constitutional scholars have found it useful to divide rights into
negative rights and positive rights.2 Negative rights usually prohibit the
government from interfering with a freedom3 and are more common in
liberal, pre-World War II constitutions.4 Negative rights are almost always
concrete because if the State violates the right, the courts will grant
individual relief.5 Positive rights, on the other hand, require the government
to provide certain things and are common among post-World War II
constitutions.6 Often referred to as “aspirational rights,” positive rights
usually convey affirmative benefits and protections.7
Courts can interpret rights as either concrete rights or programmatic
declarations. A concrete right enables a citizen to sue if the State denies him
or her that right.8 However, a programmatic declaration only guides the
legislature, directing it to pass legislation that promotes the right.9
Programmatic declarations provide no mechanism for citizens to seek
judicial relief if the government fails to provide or enforce the right.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court of Japan should
recognize and apply the concrete, negative right10 within Article 25 in its
ruling, enabling the individual to bring a claim against the government.
Article 25 is currently understood to be a programmatic declaration, which
merely directs the legislature to pass certain programs (such as social
welfare programs), and a concrete right that provides a justiciably
enforceable claim. As a concrete, negative right, Article 25 allows an
individual to bring a claim against the State for infringing upon a right. A
positive right mandates the government act (i.e. provide certain benefits)
whereas a negative right prohibits the government from acting in a certain
way.11 The State can violate Article 25’s concrete, negative right in three
ways: 1) the Diet could pass a law that prevents individuals from
2

Some also refer to first-generation and second-generation rights in expressing the same distinction.
Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 6 (2004).
3
Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South
African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321, 345 (2007).
4
See Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-Economic
Rights in National Law, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 35, 45 (2006). The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides an example of a negative right. See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
5
Akira Osuka, Welfare Rights, 53 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 17 (1990).
6
See Patricia M. Wald, Some Unsolicited Advice to My Women Friends in Eastern Europe, 46
SMU L. REV. 557, 559 (1992) (using the term "aspirational rights" in the place of "positive rights").
7
See id. at 558-59.
8
See Osuka, supra note 5, at 17.
9
See id. at 18.
10
While the terms “first-generation rights” and “second-generation rights” also can apply, this
Comment uses the terms “positive rights” and “negative rights” as a matter of stylistic preference and not to
indicate any substantive difference in meaning.
11
See Wald, supra note 6, at 559; Christiansen, supra note 3, at 345.
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maintaining a minimum standard of living, 2) the executive could prevent
individuals from maintaining a minimum standard of living (independent of
any statute), and 3) the executive could enforce a law so that it infringes
upon one’s ability to maintain a minimum standard of living.
Part II of this Comment demonstrates that although the constitutional
framers drafted Article 25 as an enforceable right, the Supreme Court of
Japan has interpreted it as only a programmatic declaration. Part III argues
that Article 25 provides both a positive and a negative right, but the negative
right makes the provision enforceable, enabling an individual to bring a
claim. Part IV explains how the Court has failed to engage in any negativerights analysis in its Article 25 opinions. Part V shows how the Court’s
misinterpretation of Article 25 conflicts with Japan’s obligations under
international law. Part VI argues the Court should interpret Article 25 as a
concrete, negative right to provide the public stronger protection of the right.
This Comment makes three assumptions. First, a definition of what
constitutes a “minimum standard of living” may help the Court’s Article 25
enforcement, but deriving one is beyond the scope of this Comment. This
Comment assumes the judiciary can use a reasonableness standard to
determine whether the State infringed upon an individual’s Article 25 rights.
The Japanese judiciary should balance the harm the government imposes on
the individual against the public welfare it promotes. The courts should
employ that standard, provided they do not abuse it to avoid enforcing the
provision.
As a second assumption, this Comment recognizes that the Diet could
provide more detailed language directing the executive on how to enforce
statutes. While this could prevent the executive from improperly applying
laws so as to violate Article 25, this legislative direction counters the wide
discretion the Diet habitually gives the executive.12
Finally, this Comment treats Article 25 and other social rights as
human rights. International human rights treaties protect many of the same
rights enumerated in constitutions.13 The terms “human rights” and
“constitutional rights” are often used interchangeably within this Comment.

12

See Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, 28
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 3, 55 (1996).
13
See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of
International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 407, 407 n.2 (2003).
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ARTICLE 25 GRANTS AN INDIVIDUALLY ENFORCEABLE NEGATIVE RIGHT
ALONG WITH STATING A PROGRAMMATIC POSITIVE RIGHT

Article 25 provides a negative right in addition to a positive right, and
therefore should allow individuals to obtain judicial relief. Article 25, like
many human rights, grants both a positive right (“the State shall use its
endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare”14) and a
negative right (“[a]ll people shall have the right to maintain the minimum
standards of wholesome and cultured living”15), prohibiting the government
from preventing one from maintaining a minimum standard of living.
Positive rights are harder to enforce, and courts throughout the world are
hesitant to interpret positive rights as concrete rights,16 which explains why
so many positive rights become merely programmatic declarations. In
contrast, a negative right is naturally concrete and therefore has more force
than a positive right, which is not naturally concrete.17 The existence of both
negative and positive rights in Article 25 is supported by objective criteria
that define such rights and by examining the Article’s text.
A.

Under Objective Criteria, Article 25 Provides a Negative Right in
Addition to a Positive Right

Article 25 has three essential components of a negative right: 1) the
right focuses on the individual,18 2) the right prohibits state action,19 and 3)
injunctive relief for a violation of the right requires a preventative writ.20
Negative and positive rights delineate easily as concepts, but in reality, most
rights encompass aspects of both. When interpreting rights, one can expect
a government to take, at a minimum, the easiest route to enforcement. It
requires less effort for a state to enforce a negative right than a positive
right;21 therefore, when faced with a right both positive and negative, the
courts would at least enforce the negative right. The above criteria define
14

KENPŌ, art. 25(2).
Id. art. 25(1).
16
See Christiansen, supra note 3, at 345.
17
See Osuka, supra note 5, at 17.
18
Charles H. Brower II, NAFTA's Investment Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-Generation
Rights, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1533, 1538 (2003) (referencing the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights as a document possessing negative rights).
19
See Ezer, supra note 2, at 4.
20
Requiring a preventative writ is not a formal criterion for a negative right. However, it logically
follows that a preventative writ to stop a prohibited state action would provide redress.
21
See Wald, supra note 6, at 559 (positing the view that positive rights cannot be judicially
enforceable); Wiles, supra note 4, at 50 (restating arguments about the difficulty in legally enforcing socioeconomic rights).
15
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Article 25 as both a positive and a negative right; thus, the courts should
prefer interpreting Article 25 as a negative right because of the relative ease
in enforcement.
The first element in establishing that a negative right exists requires
an examination of whether the right’s language focuses on the individual or
the State. Language in a positive right directs the State; language of a
negative right focuses on the individual.22 The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution exemplifies the individual focus of negative
rights. The right holds that “No person shall be held to answer for
any . . . crime . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence.”23
The language aims at the individual’s freedom. Article IX of the
Washington State Constitution provides an example of a positive right: “It is
the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of
all children residing within its borders.”24 Unlike the Fifth Amendment,
Article IX focuses on the State and its duty.
When applied to Article 25, the objective criteria show that the
Promotions Clause25 provides a positive right while the Minimum Standards
Clause26 provides both a positive and negative right. Under the first criteria,
Section 1 focuses on the individual: “All people shall have the right.”27
However, Section 2 focuses on the State: “the State shall use its
endeavors.”28 On whole, therefore, Article 25 provides a negative right and
a positive right.
The second criterion examines whether the right requires state action
or prohibits it. A positive right requires the State to take affirmative action,
often demanding state resources29 and intervening in private affairs.30 A
negative right restricts certain governmental action upon an individual.
Applying the above examples, the Fifth Amendment lists a number of
individual liberties of which the State cannot interfere.31 If the government
22

See Ezer, supra note 2, at 4.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
24
WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1, available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/LawsAndAgencyRules/
constitution.htm (emphasis added).
25
KENPŌ, art. 25(2) (“In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and
extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.”).
26
Id. art. 25(1) (“All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome
and cultured living.”).
27
Id. (emphasis added).
28
Id. art. 25(2) (emphasis added).
29
See Ezer, supra note 2, at 4; Wiles, supra note 4, at 45.
30
See Brower, supra note 18, at 1545.
31
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (granting the right not to be held for a crime without a grand jury
indictment, the right against double jeopardy, the right against self-incrimination, the right to due process
of law, and the right not to have private property taken for public use without just compensation).
23
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does not do anything to infringe upon the rights, no violation occurs.
Contrarily, if Washington State does not act to “make ample provision for
the education of all children,”32 then the government violates the right.
This second criterion paints Article 25 as a negative and positive right.
The Minimum Standards Clause mandates the State “use its endeavors for
the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public
health.”33 The text of the Promotion’s Clause does not clearly point to
government restraint or government action. Intuitively, Section 1 could
require the State to provide a minimum standard of living. Yet, Section 1
implicitly prohibits the government from interfering upon one’s attempts to
maintain a minimum standard of living. If everyone has “the right to
maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living,”34 then a
state action that prevents someone from maintaining a minimum standard of
living would violate that right. Little sense lies in providing a right but
allowing the government to deny its existence by abusively violating it. Just
as the Fifth Amendment right against forcibly being a witness against
oneself35 restricts the State from interfering with that right, the right to a
minimum standard of living prevents the State from interfering with that
right as well. Section 1’s textual phrasing may not give a clear answer as to
what action it requires from the State, but it appears to hold aspects of both a
negative and a positive right.
The final criterion examines whether injunctive relief for a violation
of the right would require state action or prohibit it. Injunctive relief for a
positive right requires the State to provide something, and the court issues an
affirmative writ. Conversely, injunctive relief for a negative right requires
the State to stop acting, and the court issues a preventative writ.36
The type of injunctive relief required for effective enforcement
defines Article 25 as a positive and a negative right. An affirmative writ for
Article 25 requires legislation or executive action providing benefits that
enable a person to maintain a minimum standard of living, essentially
actively decreasing poverty rates. At the same time, one also can imagine a
situation wherein the State’s actions violate an Article 25 right. For
example, in Asahi v. Japan, the minister, after stopping all governmental
payment assistance to Asahi, took an additional 900 yen from Asahi.37 In the
32

WASH. CONST. art. IX.
KENPŌ, art. 25.
34
Id.
35
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36
See Christiansen, supra note 3, at 345.
37
Asahi v. Japan, 21 MINSHŪ 5, 1043 (Sup. Ct., May 24, 1967), translated in HIROSHI ITOH &
LAWRENCE WARD BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 133 (1978) [hereinafter Asahi].
33
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Staple Food Act Case,38 the government prosecuted the defendant for
obtaining food above the ration limit. In the Health Insurance Case,39 the
mayor required payment of health insurance premiums the appellant could
not afford, while refusing to apply any exemption or reduction because the
appellant lived in a constant state of poverty rather than temporary
hardship.40 In all these cases, a preventative writ could redress the
violations, assuming the Court engaged in the reasonableness standard test.41
Furthermore, the government would find these preventative writs easier to
enforce than the affirmative writs.42
B.

A Textual Reading of Article 25 Supports Its Classification as Both a
Positive and a Negative Right

A plain text reading of Article 25 also establishes that it supplies both
a positive and a negative right. Section 2 indicates a positive, albeit
unenforceable, right because it instructs the legislature and executive to
promote social welfare.43 Article 25(2) directs the Diet to enact legislation
promoting the public’s ability to maintain a minimum standard of living.44
Two qualities of Article 25’s text support it as containing a negative
right: 1) the principle that disapproves of reading text so as to make a
provision superfluous, and 2) the definition of “maintain.” First, an accepted
American cannon of construction directs interpretation of legal text so as not
to render a portion superfluous.45 Therefore, if Article 25 provides only an
unenforceable programmatic declaration as the Supreme Court contends,
then Section 1 only adds redundancy to the provision. However, if Section 1
articulates a negative right, prohibiting the State from interfering with one’s
minimum standard of living, then Section 1 adds meaning not articulated in
Section 2.
Second, the definition of “maintain” characterizes Article 25 as a
negative right. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “maintain” as meaning “to
38
See 2 (No. 6) MINSHŪ 1235 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 29, 1948), translated in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND
CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 254-55 (1964) [hereinafter Staple Food Act Case].
39
Case no. 2000 Gyo-Tsu 62, 60 MINSHŪ 2, translated in http://www.courts.go.jp/english/
judgments/text/2006.03.01-2000.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..62.html [hereinafter Health Insurance Case].
40
Id. at Reasons III.
41
See infra Part V.B. (establishing that a negative-rights interpretation of Article 25 is practical,
promoting courts to issue preventative writs).
42
See infra Part V.B.
43
See KENPŌ, art. 25(2) (“the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social
welfare and security, and of public health”).
44
Id.
45
See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 61 (2008). While this follows American constitutional
law, the logical argument applies to the Japanese Constitution.
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continue (something).”46 The definition gives the impression of inertia, that
a person already has or already is working to achieve a minimum standard of
living. A violation of the Article is one that changes the status quo; it stops
the existing situation, preventing it from continuing. That violation
manifests itself as government action that prevents one from continuing to
have or continuing to work towards achieving a minimum standard of living.
Thus, Article 25, Section 1 provides a negative right.
C.

Positive and Negative Rights May Coexist; They Are Not Mutually
Exclusive

The international legal community would easily accept the position
that Article 25(1) provides both a positive and negative right.47 Even though
the Minimum Standards Clause communicates a positive right on the
surface, it also contains a concrete, negative right, enabling individuals to
obtain relief from the courts. International human rights legal theory has
begun to reject the binary distinction between negative and positive rights,48
supporting the argument that Article 25 provides both a negative and a
positive right. Legal theorists have fused the negative and positive rights
categories together, viewing rights as simultaneously encompassing both as
different sides of the same coin.49
Judicially enforcing positive rights proves more difficult than negative
rights.50 Courts may rule a positive right not concrete, but they will find a
coexisting negative right as concrete and identify the judiciary as the proper
institution to provide individual relief. Therefore, the Court ruling Article 25
as a positive right would not foreclose interpreting Article 25 as a concrete,
negative right.
As the South African Constitutional Court has recognized: “The
obligations created by the socioeconomic rights in the South African
Constitution take two basic forms. They impose a negative duty not to
interfere with, or create barriers to the fulfillment of the rights in question,
46
47
48

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (8th ed. 2004).
See Osuka, supra note 5, at 17.
Ida Elisabeth Koch, Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 85

(2005).
49
See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, International Law, Human Rights, and Latcrit Theory:
Civil and Political Rights—an Introduction, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 223, 236-37 (1997) (indicating
the conception of negative rights as only civil and political rights is misleading because such rights also can
be categorized as positive rights, requiring affirmative state action).
50
See Osuka, supra note 5, at 17 (discussing how “as to the guarantee of a negative right under the
Constitution, all the theories recognize the legal nature of the right to a decent life as giving rise to
judicially enforceable concrete rights,” while “the guarantee of any positive right” is not so universally
held); Wiles, supra note 4, at 50 (discussing why positive rights are seen as unenforceable).
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and a positive duty to promote and fulfill those rights.”51 No clear
separation exists between negative and positive rights; instead, most rights
incorporate aspects of both. The South African Constitutional Court has
asserted that, “At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be
negatively protected from improper invasion.”52 While social rights may fail
justiciability as positive rights, they are enforceable as negative rights.53
III.

THE FRAMERS DRAFTED ARTICLE 25 AS AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT BUT
THE COURT MISINTERPRETS IT AS A PROGRAMMATIC DECLARATION

Those framing the Showa Constitution in 1946 intended Article 25 to
provide an enforceable, positive right. However, members of the former,
ultra-conservative, Japanese government formed the judiciary.54 Within two
years, the Supreme Court interpreted Article 25 as merely a programmatic
declaration,55 a position reaffirmed as recently as 2006.56 Furthermore,
when the Court addresses Article 25 claims, it fails to engage in any
negative-rights analysis.
A.

The Drafters Intended Article 25 to Provide an Enforceable Right

Members of the Governmental Section (“GS”) of the Supreme
Commander Allied Powers (“SCAP”)57 drafted Article 25 as a forceful,
positive right. Following World War II, the GS drafted Japan’s Showa
Constitution.58 They modeled it after Germany’s Weimar Constitution,59
demonstrating the intended force behind the social rights provisions. The
51
Joan Fitzpatrick and Ron C. Slye, Economic and Social Rights-South Africa-Role of International
Standards in Interpreting and Implementing Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 669,
676 (2003).
52
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 78 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/uhtbin/cgisirsi/20080217183929/SIRSI/0/520/J-CCT23-96.
53
See supra notes 5, 17 and accompanying text (stating that negative rights are enforceable).
54
See Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese
Constitution and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 443 (1998) (stating the “judiciary was never
purged to remove from positions of authority individuals with . . . obvious opposition to the new
Constitution”).
55
See Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 254-55; Osuka, supra note 5, at 17 (explaining how
the Supreme Court found in the Staple Food Act Case that Article 25 was purely a “programmatic
declaration”).
56
See generally Health Insurance Case, supra note 39.
57
General McArthur led the Supreme Commander Allied Powers [“SCAP”], the American force
overseeing the occupation. See RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY 4-6
(2002).
58
BEATE SIROTA GORDON, THE ONLY WOMAN IN THE ROOM 104 (1977).
59
See Osuka, supra note 5, at 16 (stating that social rights were modeled on the Weimar Constitution
and incorporated American New Deal characteristics).
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drafters wrote the document to require the government to provide for the
people. However, those involved in the enacting process did not have
uniform expectations for the new constitution,60 and the Japanese
government pushed back vigorously, which ultimately led to vaguer
language than the drafters desired.61
The Weimar Constitution and New Deal philosophy heavily
influenced the drafters of Japan’s Showa Constitution, explaining the social
rights’ weight and force. The steering committee leading the GS contained
few people familiar with Japan.62 While most were American lawyers,
military officials, and political scientists, all were New Dealers who
incorporated their perspectives in forming Japan’s new Constitution.63 A
shared sense of responsibility existed among many drafting the Showa
Constitution’s provisions “to effect a social revolution in Japan, and the most
expedient way of doing that is to force through a reversal of social patterns
by means of the constitution.”64 They used the Weimar Constitution as a
model, which had provided Germans with social welfare rights65 intended to
be concrete, positive rights.66 Drafters applied the philosophy encompassed
within the Weimar Constitution, which professed the State’s duty to promote
social welfare policies to social and civil rights provisions.67 In one week
and in complete secrecy, the GS drafted the Showa Constitution,68 crediting

60

See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 103-04.
See GORDON, supra note 58, at 120-24.
62
MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 97-98.
63
Id. at 98.
64
GORDON, supra note 58, at 116; Fritz Snyder, The Fundamental Human Rights, 14 INT’L LEGAL
PERSP. 30, 31 (2005).
65
See WEIMAR CONSTITUTION, pt. 2, ch. 4 (granting the right to education); ch. 5, art. 157, 159, 165
(granting the right to organize labor and promoting collective bargaining); ch. 5, art. 161 (granting
universal insurance) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.zum.de/psm/weimar/weimar_vve.php. Social rights
in the Weimar Constitution required the State establish comprehensive insurance systems and granted every
person the opportunity to work or economic support if no appropriate work was available.
66
The Social Democrats involved in forming the Japanese Constitution saw the Weimar Constitution
as a model modern constitution because it used positive rights to adjust constitutional doctrine to modern
conditions. State power used social welfare measures to protect and further wanted modern constitutions to
reflect this new state. According to Social Democrats, Germany’s democracy collapsed because the
Weimar Constitution was not truly in force. The social rights included within the Weimar Constitution
were positive, concrete rights; however, while they may have been individually justiciable, in reality they
could not be enforced without judicial review. See Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Guarantees of Social
Welfare in the Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 304 (1999); MOORE & ROBINSON,
supra note 57, at 256.
67
GORDON, supra note 58, at 110 (documenting Beate Sirota Gordon’s philosophy for constitutional
rights, one that was common among the Governmental Section).
68
Snyder, supra note 64, at 32. It is important to acknowledge that neither the American occupation
authorities nor the Japanese officials working with SCAP “talked past” or “duped” each other,
misunderstanding the constitutional scheme envisioned by the other. Ford, supra note 12, at 58.
61
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the document to the Japanese government to give it greater legitimacy.69
The original SCAP version of the Showa Constitution included a number of
provisions from the Weimar Constitution that granted specific rights.70
Thus, the drafters originally intended that Article 25 supply an enforceable,
positive social right.71
The framers did not all hold one view about how the judiciary would
interpret the social rights provisions; however, a strong contingent believed
the social rights provisions provided a forceful and progressive mandate on
the government’s public role.72 Two camps within SCAP, the practicalists
and the idealists, disagreed on social policy, and eventually General
Whitney73 had to make an executive decision “to leave out detailed policies
and to include instead a general statement providing for social welfare
protection.”74 The drafters wanted the social rights provisions to contain
strong, enforceable language, but the steering committee tempered the
language for political reasons, hoping this would instigate the Japanese
government to agree faster and with less resistance.75 Although the steering
committee struck down prospects for strong, positive rights enforcement, the
forceful spirit remained in the negative right of Article 25, albeit dormant
due to the judiciary’s failure to recognize the negative right. As it is written,
Article 25 consists of a positive right (the Promotions Clause directs the
government to enact policies that promote the public’s ability to maintain a
minimum standard of living)76 and a negative right (the Minimum Standards
Clause prohibits the government from preventing one from maintaining a
minimum standard of living).77
69

Id. at 32.
See GORDON, supra note 58, at 107 (stating Gordon's special interest in the Weimar Constitution
as a model when drafting social rights provisions of the Showa Constitution); Snyder, supra note 64, at 32
(listing many of the specific provisions Gordon included).
71
See, e.g.,Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and Its Various Influences: Japanese,
American, and European, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 24 (1990) (stating that Japan’s Constitution “is
more extensive than that of the American Constitution” because it “enumerates socioeconomic rights
because of the influence of the Weimar Constitution and the experience of the American New Dealers”).
72
See Snyder, supra note 64, at 31.
73
General Whitney was a chief aid to General MacArthur. MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 57, at
6.
74
GORDON, supra note 58, at 116.
75
Id. at 120 (stating that MacArthur was in a hurry to draft the Constitution before the Allied
powers, who opposed MacArthur’s imperial system, established the Far Eastern Commission, and Japan
had an election scheduled for April 10).
76
The Livelihood Protection Act is an example of a law passed to promote the public’s ability to
maintain a minimum standard of living. See Osuka, supra note 5, at 16 (stating that the present Livelihood
Protection Act of 1950 provided a legal means to confirm the right to a decent life).
77
The Minimum Standards Clause can be defined as both a negative and a positive right. See supra
Part II.
70
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Contrary to Its Textual Meaning and Original Intent, the Judiciary
Has Interpreted Article 25 as Merely a Programmatic Declaration

Contrary to the drafters’ intentions and the provision’s textual
meaning, early judicial holdings refused to recognize Article 25 as a
concrete or a negative right.78 The first judiciary under the new democratic
Showa Constitution consisted of government officials from the prior
regime.79 They held ultra-conservative beliefs about the government’s role
to promote the general welfare,80 applying this ideology in Article 25 case
decisions.
Individuals have repeatedly come to the judiciary seeking relief,
claiming the State violated their Article 25 right. In each instance, the Court
rejected the plaintiff’s claim for relief. Three cases illustrate how the
Supreme Court repeatedly interprets Article 25 as a programmatic
declaration. The Court first interpreted Article 25 in the Staples Food Act
Case, gave a historic ruling in Asahi, and provided a recent opinion in the
Health Insurance Case. Additionally, one more case demonstrates how this
social rights81 interpretation conflicts with international human rights treaty
obligations.82
In 1948, the Supreme Court first interpreted Article 25 as a mere
programmatic declaration in the Staples Food Act Case. In this case, the
defendant violated the Staple Food Management Law by purchasing and
transporting a small amount of rice.83 The Staple Food Management Law
regulated price, supply, and demand as well as rationed foodstuffs to
guarantee the population had staple foods and a stable economy.84 The
defendant claimed the Staple Food Management Law, and its application,
violated his Article 25 right because he could not maintain a minimum
standard of living on the rations.85 He pled, “It is impossible to preserve life
or maintain health on the current food ration.”86

78

See Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 255.
Hamano, supra note 54, at 443.
80
Id.
81
Constitutional scholars distinguish social rights and political rights, which correspond to the
positive and negative rights distinctions. Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna):
The Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American
Human Rights System, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008).
82
See generally Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 253-56; Asahi, supra note 37; Health
Insurance Case, supra note 39.
83
Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 253, 255.
84
Id. at 253.
85
Id. at 255.
86
Id. at 254.
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Second, the Court affirmed the programmatic declaration
interpretation of Article 25 in Asahi v. Japan without addressing whether
Article 25 granted a negative right.87 Shigeru Asahi, a tuberculosis patient at
the Okayama National Sanitarium, received 600 yen (U.S. $1.75)88 a month
in government assistance,89 the highest amount the minister of welfare
allowed.90 However, this could not support him. When his brother began
sending him 1,500 yen (U.S. $4.38) each month,91 the minister of the social
welfare office ceased the welfare payments.92 Moreover, the minister
ordered Asahi to pay the government an additional 900 yen each month from
what his brother sent to cover part of Asahi’s expenses.93 Asahi claimed the
minister’s application of the Livelihood Protection Act violated his Article
25 rights.94
The Supreme Court ruled against Asahi and held that Article 25
“merely proclaims that it is a duty of the State to administer national policy
in such a manner as to enable all the people to enjoy at least the minimum
standards of wholesome and cultured living, and it does not grant the people
as individuals any concrete rights.”95 Reiterating much of what it held in the
Staple Food Act Case,96 the Court reaffirmed the minister’s discretion to
apply the law.97
Recently, the Supreme Court maintained its programmatic declaration
interpretation of Article 25, ignoring any negative-rights analysis, in the
2006 Health Insurance Case.98 Here, the appellant sued the City of
Asahikawa because the mayor required full health insurance premiums
despite the plaintiff’s claim that he could not afford them.99 The National
Health Insurance Act mandated universal coverage100 and delegated
regulation to the local municipalities.101 Under the national health insurance
87

Asahi, supra note 37, at 130.
Id. These are 1978 dollars. Today, 600 yen translates into U.S. $5.53.
89
Id. at 133.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 133. Today 1500 yen translates into U.S. $13.84.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
See id. at 133-34.
95
Id. at 134 (quoting 2 KEISHŪ 1235 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 29, 1948) [Staple Food Act Case]). Asahi also
received free meals, medical treatment, and accommodations at the hospital.
96
Id. at 134.
97
Interestingly, Asahi spurred an immense amount of scholarship within Japan, advocating that the
Court interpret Article 25 as a concrete, positive right. Osuka, supra note 5, at 17.
98
See generally Health Insurance Case, supra note 39.
99
Id. at Reasons I(1), III.
100
Kokumin Kenkō Hōkenhō [National Health Insurance Law], Law No. 192 of 1958, art. 5,
translated in 8 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 8430 (1983).
101
Id. art. 3.
88
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system, heads of households paid a premium or tax to finance the
program.102 However, the local ordinance that enforced the system in
Asahikawa did not account for those in a constant state of poverty;103 it only
allowed payment exemptions and reductions if lives became excessively
difficult due to unforeseen disasters or incomes fell significantly in that
particular year.104
The Court found the ordinance’s restriction of premium reductions to
only those in temporary financial hardship not excessively unreasonable or
unreasonably discriminatory against the economically weak.105 According
to the Court, the Social Security Act justified the mayor’s method of
collecting premiums because it covered those permanently poor.106 The
Court therefore held the National Health Insurance Act and the ordinance did
not guarantee reduced payments for the permanently impoverished.107 Thus,
the Court found the mayor complied with Article 25 despite the fact that he
forced the appellant to pay insurance premiums he could not afford.108 The
Court affirmed the mayor’s discretion to enforce the ordinance for the
Health Insurance Act, found the Social Security Act covered the poor, and
the Court therefore quickly dismissed the Article 25 claim.109
The emergence of international law and deliberate treaty ratifications
strengthened Japan’s established human rights protections by law despite the
Supreme Court’s continued weak application of constitutional rights. Article
98(2) of the Showa Constitution gives international treaties the force of law
within the country.110 Strong judicial enforcement of treaty rights often
conflicts with the Court’s weak enforcement of constitutional rights, leaving
the lower courts uncertain as to the extent they should protect human rights,
as the Fingerprint Case illustrates.111 Here, a Korean political leader
applying for a replacement registration card refused to allow police officers

102

Id. arts. 42(1), 43, 44.
Health Insurance Case, supra note 39, at Reasons I(1).
104
Id. at Reasons III.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
KENPŌ, art. 98(2) (“Treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully
observed.”).
111
Hamano, supra note 54, at 476-77 (discussing 1513 HANREI J IHŌ 71 (Osaka High Ct., Oct. 28,
1994) [hereinafter Fingerprint Case]; Arrest Over Fingerprinting Refusal Not Illegal Supreme Court Rules,
JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 8, 1998). In this case, the international treaties conferred the same rights as the
Constitution, preventing the judiciary from providing a consistent ruling while simultaneously strictly
enforcing the treaty obligations but not enforcing the constitutional claims.
103
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to fingerprint him, as the Alien Registration Law required.112 After being
arrested for declining “repeated requests to appear for ‘voluntary’ police
questioning,”113 officers strip-searched, forcibly fingerprinted and
interrogated him, holding the man for the day.114 The man sued, claiming
the legal requirement of fingerprinting violated Articles 13 (right to life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness)115 and 14 (equal protection)116 of the
Showa Constitution and Articles 7 (degrading treatment)117 and 26
(prohibition against discrimination/equal protection)118 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.119 The high court ruled for the
plaintiff on all four counts, but the Supreme Court overturned the decision
without recognizing the international treaty claims.120
C.

Japan Corrects Interpretations of Its Constitution Through
Constitutional Transformation Rather than Amendment

The Supreme Court can fix its misinterpretation of Article 25 through
so-called constitutional transformation. The Showa Constitution has never
been formally amended;121 instead, Japan keeps its supreme legal document
relevant through constitutional transformation.122
Constitutional
transformation “is deemed to mean ‘a change in the meaning of particular
constitutional provision(s) brought about through “reinterpretation” of the
provision rather than through formal constitutional amendment.’”123
Shifting the judiciary’s interpretation of Article 25 is therefore reasonable,
practical, and appropriate given the country’s reticence to amend the
constitution.124
Interest in constitutional amendment made a brief surge in the early
1950s and culminated in 1957, when the government appointed an official
Commission on the Constitution to study the issue.125 However, the
112

Id. at 476.
Id.
Id.
115
KENPŌ, art. 13.
116
Id. art. 14.
117
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, art. 7 [hereinafter ICCPR].
118
Id. art. 26.
119
Hamano, supra note 54, at 476 (discussing the Fingerprint Case).
120
Id. at 477, 480.
121
Snyder, supra note 64, at 48.
122
Ford, supra note 12, at 58.
123
Id. (quoting Tomosuke Kasuya, Constitutional Transformation and the Ninth Article of the
Japanese Constitution, 18 LAW IN JAPAN 1 (Paul S. Taylor trans., 1986)).
124
Id. at 56.
125
Id.
113
114
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Commission’s 1964 report failed to put forth any recommendations and laid
to rest any prospect for future amendments.126
Absent the possibility of constitutional amendment, judges and legal
scholars rely on constitutional transformation to keep the Showa
Constitution effective and to eliminate disjunction between constitutional
norms and social reality.127 Constitutional transformation is more than a
theoretical proposition; the Supreme Court has adopted the idea “to fashion a
new garment out of the constitutional fabric supplied by the Americans in
1947.”128 Therefore, even though the Court has disregarded the true intent
of Article 25, it can correct its wrongs in the same manner it adjusts other
outdated constitutional interpretations simply by employing constitutional
transformation.
D.

When the Court Addresses Article 25 Claims, It Fails to Engage in
Any Negative-Rights Analyses

When promulgating judicial decisions, the Court fails to examine
Article 25 from a negative-rights perspective, the view that provides easier
enforcement. Therefore, while the Court has repeatedly ruled against
plaintiffs in Article 25 suits, it has yet to issue an opinion declaring that
Article 25 is not a negative right and is unenforceable as such. Untrodden
ground exists for the Court to rule Article 25 contains a concrete, negative
right. The three aforementioned cases demonstrate the Court’s silence on
the negative-positive rights distinction.
In the Staple Food Act Case, rather than examining whether the State
actually prevented the defendant from maintaining a minimum standard of
living, the Court only focused on Article 25 as conferring a positive,
programmatic declaration and justifying the Staple Food Act’s application.129
In addition to holding that the Promotions Clause130 merely declared the
government take positive action to strengthen social services,131 the Court
further held that the Minimum Standards Clause132 was also a declaration to
126

Id.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 59. Perhaps the most common example is Article 9 of the Showa Constitution, the provision
renouncing war and prohibiting a military force. See Canon Pence, Reform in the Rising Sun: Koizumi’s
Bid to Revise Japan’s Pacifist Constitution, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 335, 373-74 (2006); Kenneth
L. Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 127,
150-51 (2005).
129
Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 255.
130
KENPŌ, art. 25(2).
131
See Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 254-55.
132
KENPŌ, art. 25(1).
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enact and enforce social legislation.133 According to the Court, “the state
does not bear such an obligation [to strengthen and extend social services]
concretely and materially toward the people as individuals.”134 The Court
only considered the positive rights aspect and ruled the Showa Constitution
obligates the State to provide social services, but individuals cannot demand
they receive these social services.135 Thus, the Court transformed Article 25
from a right to a declaration, deviating from its original intended force.
However, the Court’s opinion shows it only considered Article 25 under a
positive rights lens.
The Court’s use of the word “any” in the Asahi opinion could
incorporate negative and positive rights, but the emphasis on “duty of the
state” and administering policy so as to “enable” indicates an emphasis on
positive rights rather than preventing state interference.136 The Court
declared that only the laws enacted under Article 25 provide concrete
rights.137 Article 25 did not protect individuals against government actions
violating the provision. Once again, the Court’s language focused on the
possibility that Article 25 might require the government to provide
something;138 the Court then found Article 25 as a nonjusticiable, positive
right, without using the negative-positive rights distinction.139
In the Health Insurance Case, the Court briefly addressed the
appellant’s Article 25 claim. Upon doing so, the Court quickly dismissed
it,140 effectively ignoring any negative-rights analysis. The government
applied the Social Security Act and the Health Insurance Act, preventing the
plaintiff from being covered by either. Therefore, the government’s
application of the laws left the plaintiff unable to afford health insurance or
comply with the law mandating coverage. However, the Court only saw the
appellant’s claim about the State’s failure to provide health insurance,141 not
the barriers it created to obtain health care and follow the law.

133

See Staple Food Act Case, supra note 38, at 255.
Id.
135
Id.
136
Asahi, supra note 37, at 134-35.
137
Id. at 134 (“A concrete right is secured only through the provisions of the Livelihood Protection
Law enacted to realize the objectives prescribed in the provisions of the Constitution.”).
138
See id.
139
Id.
140
Health Insurance Case, supra note 39, at Reasons III.
141
See generally id.
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IV.

MISINTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 25 AS MERELY A PROGRAMMATIC
DECLARATION CONFLICTS WITH JAPAN’S TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Japan’s lower courts have struggled to follow the Supreme Court’s
constitutional holdings because these holdings conflict with treaty provisions
guaranteeing rights similar to those granted in the Showa Constitution.
Starting in the 1970s, the legislature began ratifying a number of
international treaties containing rights that reinforced those enumerated in
the Showa Constitution, including Article 25.142 For example, within the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), Article 3
grants the right to equal protection143 and Article 7 guarantees the right
against inhuman and degrading punishment.144 The United Nations
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”) provides the right to organize labor in Articles 7 and 9145 and
guarantees the right to an adequate standard of living in Article 11.146 The
Showa Constitution provides these same rights.147
A.

Japan Has Ratified International Human Rights Treaties That
Reinforce Constitutional Rights, Including That of Article 25

Japan joined the international community to ratify human rights
treaties, which enumerated rights already existing within the Showa
Constitution. Article 98(2) of the Showa Constitution gives treaties the force
of law148 equal to legislatively-created law. When ratified without
reservations,149 the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary must follow
and adhere to the treaties as they abide by constitutional and statutory
provisions.150 These treaties specifically reinforced the right to social

142

See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status by Country,
http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/newhvstatusbycountry?OpenView (expand “Japan” hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 22, 2008) (showing when Japan ratified various international human rights treaties).
143
ICCPR, supra note 117, art. 3.
144
Id. art. 7.
145
United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 7, 9 [hereinafter ICESCR].
146
Id. art. 11.
147
KENPŌ, arts. 14, 25 (granting the right to equal protection, a minimum standard of living, to
organize labor, and against cruel punishment).
148
Id. art. 98(2) (“treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully
observed”).
149
Hamano, supra note 54, at 468.
150
Id.
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standards.151 The two most prominent are the ICCPR, ratified in 1979,152
and the ICESCR, ratified in 1979.153
The ICCPR and ICESCR contain provisions that mirror the
Constitution’s social rights provisions. Article 11(1) of ICESCR requires
states to “recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right.”154 This
language resembles Article 25’s “right to maintain the minimum standards of
wholesome and cultured living” and its requirement that the State “use its
endeavors” to promote “social welfare and security.”155
The absence of any noteworthy reservations indicates that the
Japanese government wanted full enforcement of the treaties as written.156
The government had the option to accept the treaties conditionally by
making reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”). RUDs
allow a country to become party to an international treaty in a qualified
manner by exempting itself from certain obligations mandated upon member
states.157 It is significant that before ratifying the treaties, the Japanese
Government engaged in careful reviews of the legal system to ensure
compliance158 and accepted the treaties without modification.

151
Additional treaty examples include Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Japan signed these treaties in 1982 and 1985.
See United Nations Treaty Collection: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2ref.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008); Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Japan, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (expand “Japan” hyperlink; then follow “CEDAW-Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
152
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Japan, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (expand “Japan” hyperlink; then follow “CCPR-International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
153
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Japan, http://www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (expand “Japan” hyperlink; then follow “CESCR-International
Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
154
ICESCR, supra note 145, art. 11 (emphasis added).
155
KENPŌ, art. 25.
156
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Japan, supra note 152 (lacking any
documents on reservations and only noting one procedural reservation); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Japan, supra note 153 (lacking any documents on reservations and
only noting a few procedural reservations on such things as specialized secondary and higher education,
social security, leisure, and labor unions).
157
Eric Neumayer, Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights
Treaties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (2007).
158
Hamano, supra note 54, at 468.
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The Court Defers to the Other Branches When Interpreting
Constitutional Rights, Which Conflicts with Treaty Obligations

Even though the treaties and the Showa Constitution have the same
force of law, the Court enforces them differently. Rather than enforce the
constitutional rights of Article 25, or the other social rights provisions, the
Supreme Court defers to the other branches of government to enforce these
rights. However, the Court does not extend that same deference when
interpreting and enforcing rights under international treaties ratified by the
government.159
Judicial opinions illustrate this conflict and further
illuminate the growing division between the lower courts and the Supreme
Court. A negative-rights interpretation of constitutional rights (including
Article 25) that provides greater enforcement and stronger protection would
harmonize interpretations of international treaty rights with constitutional
rights by giving them the same force.
Rights under international treaties have strong legal force, but when
considering those same rights under the Showa Constitution, the Court
defers to the other branches of government rather than providing strong
enforcement. Plaintiffs regularly bring actions160 claiming the violation of a
right under both the Constitution and the ICCPR. Both are legally binding
within Japan’s domestic legal system.161 When confronted with these
mirroring claims, the Supreme Court either ignores the treaty right or
renders a very narrow interpretation of it.162 This unfortunate outcome runs
counter to those principles embedded within Japan’s legal tradition and
culture for “balance” and “harmony” between competing claims of right.163
The Supreme Court’s rulings leave to lower courts the task of
reconciling opposing interpretations of similar rights. To resolve this
conflict, some lower courts started applying constitutional rights more
vigorously to conform to treaty rights. This approach, however, has created
a rift between lower court and Supreme Court decisions. The treaty
ratifications “rejuvenated litigation over the breadth of human rights
protection in Japan,” and the courts found themselves drawn into questions
of direct conflict.164 At first, the courts simply narrowed their interpretation

159
See id. at 469 (using strong language about judicial enforcement of treaty rights, particularly the
ICCPR, which provide broad rights compared to constitutional rights narrowed by the courts).
160
See id. at 476-77.
161
KENPŌ, art. 98(2).
162
See supra Part III.B.
163
Ford, supra note 12, at 34, 48.
164
Hamano, supra note 54, at 469.
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of the rights guaranteed within the treaties by denying valid claims.165
However, around 1993 a shift occurred among the lower courts, and rulings
began to recognize international human rights principles.166 To provide a
consistent interpretation of treaty and constitutional rights, the lower courts
ultimately began to enforce the constitutional rights more vigorously and did
not passively defer to the executive as the judiciary system as a whole had
done previously.
The Fingerprint Case reveals the conflict between lower courts and
the Supreme Court about the judiciary’s interpretations of human rights.167
While the Fingerprint Case did not contain an Article 25 claim, it
demonstrates the Court’s deference to the other branches of government in
constitutional claims and the resulting conflict with similar international
treaty claims. The conflicting interpretations between the Supreme Court
and the lower courts, as well as between the constitutional claims and
international treaty claims, hinder Japan’s solid legal tradition of harmonious
rulings and interpretations. In the Fingerprint Case, the defendant sought a
replacement alien registration card but refused to provide fingerprints or
submit to “voluntary” questioning.168 He sued, claiming the fingerprint
requirement violated Articles 13 and 14 of the Constitution169 (right to life
liberty, and pursuit of happiness; equal protection)170 as well as Articles 7
and 26 of the ICCPR171 (degrading treatment; equal protection).172 While
the plaintiff did not raise an Article 25 claim, the judicial rulings on
constitutional rights apply to Article 25 decisions.173 The Osaka High
Court’s ruling for the plaintiff found the ICCPR and the Constitution
provided broad human rights protection.174 The Osaka High Court held that
165

See id. at 469-70 (describing the various narrow views taken regarding treaty rights).
Id. at 473.
167
An earlier Supreme Court ruling, similar to the Fingerprint Case, demonstrates imbalance within
the Supreme Court concerning treaty and constitutional rights treatment. In the earlier case, five of ten
judges dissented the Court’s overruling and stressed the importance of ICCPR rights. Thus, a division also
exists within the Court about the appropriate legal weight to give to the human rights treaties. Id. at 477.
168
See Hamano, supra note 54, at 476 (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra notes 111120 and accompanying text (providing details of the case).
169
Id. (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
170
KENPŌ, arts. 13, 14.
171
See Hamano, supra note 54, at 476 (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
172
ICCPR, supra note 117, arts. 7, 26.
173
Arguably, the right to a minimum standard of living is not as forceful as some of the rights
asserted by the plaintiff in the Fingerprint Case. Nonetheless, the case still provides an example applicable
to Article 25 and the general conflict created by interpreting constitutional rights with deference and
international treaty rights with strength.
174
Hamano, supra note 54, at 477 (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
166
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the ICCPR expanded individual rights because many specific ICCPR
protections did not exist in Japanese domestic law.175 The Supreme Court
overturned the high court’s ruling, but it made no reference to the ICCPR
claim.176 The short opinion exhibited a common, but poorly applied,
standard in constitutional case decisions to defer to the executive. The
absence of any mention of the ICCPR claim is especially significant in the
Fingerprint Case given the apparent momentum in the lower courts to
broaden the scope of individuals’ rights by recognizing the rights provided in
the ICCPR.177
The Court’s refusal to acknowledge the ICCPR claim in the
Fingerprint Case demonstrates the Court’s reticence to reconcile the two
supreme legal documents, showing the incompatibility between recognizing
international treaty rights and applying the Supreme Court’s lackluster
protection of constitutional rights. Both the Constitution and the ICCPR
have equal force under the Japanese legal system, should be interpreted
consistently, and neither preempts the other.178
V.

THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD INTERPRET ARTICLE 25 AS A CONCRETE,
NEGATIVE RIGHT TO PROVIDE STRONGER PROTECTION

Part V analyzes the policy behind interpreting Article 25(1) as a
concrete, negative right. This includes examining the positive consequences
resulting from such an interpretation, the practical methods to provide such
an interpretation, and the internal and external pressures pushing for such an
interpretation.
A.

Interpreting Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right Will Produce
Positive Results for Japan’s Legal System

Interpreting Article 25 as a concrete, negative right will benefit
Japan’s legal system by giving Article 25 greater force and improving
Japan’s system of checks and balances.

175

Id.
Id.
177
Id. at 480.
178
Id. at 469 (quoting Japan’s Third Periodic Report to the Human Rights Committee that implies the
government claims to view the ICCPR on the same level as the Constitution and asserts that both are to be
interpreted with similar authority).
176
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Article 25’s Concrete, Negative Right Will Improve Japan’s System of
Checks and Balances, Strengthening Its Legal System

Interpreting Article 25 as a concrete, negative right allows judicial
redress when the State violates an individual’s right to maintain a minimum
standard of living.179 Serious adherence to that responsibility requires
judicial oversight upon the executive and legislature, strengthening the
system of checks and balances and promoting a healthier, better functioning
legal system.
A healthy legal system usually requires judicial oversight of the
executive and legislature. While the Diet holds a supreme position relative
to the judiciary and executive,180 the Showa Constitution explicitly affirms
the Court’s power of judicial review.181 The constitutional framers
intentionally included Article 81 because many viewed the collapse of
German democracy under the Weimar Constitution as a result of the absence
of judicial review and a powerful judiciary capable of effective oversight.182
While the Supreme Court has demonstrated a preference for deferring
to the other governmental branches,183 it has been more willing to oversee
the executive and the Diet when faced with violations of concrete, negative
rights, especially when such violations hinder the public welfare.184 When
the Court finds a law or government action unconstitutional, it declares that
the State violated a negative right.185 Consistent with Japan’s cultural and
legal attitudes, the Court only overturns a statute or government action after
balancing the individual harm against the public welfare promoted by the
restriction.186 The negative right to maintain a minimum standard of living
does not directly oppose the general welfare, and enforcing it promotes the
general welfare because everyone benefits from the reduction of poverty.
Therefore, the Supreme Court will more likely enforce the right to a
minimum standard of living if it recognizes Article 25 as a negative right.
179

See Ezer, supra note 2, at 7-8.
Ford, supra note 12, at 42.
181
KENPŌ, art. 81 (“The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with the power to determine the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”).
182
MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 57, at 257.
183
See Hamano, supra note 54, at 435; Ford, supra note 12, at 42.
184
See Ford, supra note 12, at 29-35 (providing examples of the Supreme Court's pattern of striking
down legislation restricting negative rights provided the general welfare of the statute does not outweigh
the individual harm, which include a 1960 freedom of expression case and a 1966 workers’ rights case).
185
See id. at 30 (discussing a case where the Court struck down a law that limited the freedom of
expression); Toyama et al. v. Japan, 20 KEISHŪ 901 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 26, 1966), translated in HIROSHI ITOH
& LAWRENCE WARD BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 90-91 (1978) (ruling a law that
restricted labor rights unconstitutional).
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See Ford, supra note 12, at 26.
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The Court Must Interpret Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right to
Observe the Drafters’ Original Intent of It as a Forceful Right

Those drafting the Showa Constitution intended Article 25 to be an
enforceable right,187 and the judiciary can enforce a negative right more
easily than a positive right.188 If Article 25 only provided a positive right, it
would not be forceful, as seen with the application of merely programmatic
declarations.189 Practically, the judiciary cannot allow individuals to sue
when the State fails to eliminate poverty and provide everyone with a
minimum standard of living. Effective judicial relief would be impossible;
courts cannot force the State to do what it is incapable of doing.
Concrete, negative rights avoid these problems. A state can
reasonably refrain from doing harm whereas it cannot necessarily cure all
ills. The specific nature of the former, compared to the open-endedness of
the latter, indicates the feasibility of the negative right.190 For example, the
Court can easily order the State stop prosecuting an individual for violating
the Staple Food Act because as applied, the Act forces the man to go hungry.
The Court could also issue an opinion that warns the Diet that the Court
finds that a certain law violates the Constitution, directing the Diet to change
the law.191 The Court has trouble demanding the State eliminate poverty or
construct housing for every homeless individual. The Supreme Court, by
recognizing Article 25’s concrete, negative right, would grant relief only on
specific occasions when the State actively prevented someone from
maintaining his or her minimum standard of living.
3.

Interpreting Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right Resolves the
Conflict Between the Constitution and International Treaties

The judiciary could take one of three approaches to resolve the
existing conflict between the level of protection the judiciary applies to
constitutional rights with that applied to international treaty rights. First, the
courts could rule each document provides a different level of protection.
187

See supra Part III.A.
See Wald, supra note 6, at 559 (positing the view that positive rights cannot be judicially
enforceable); see also Wiles, supra note 4, at 50 (restating arguments about the difficulty in legally
enforcing socio-economic rights).
189
See Asahi, supra note 37, at 134 (holding and quoting the Staple Food Act Case that Article 25
“merely proclaims that it is a duty of the State to administer national policy in such a manner as to enable
all the people to enjoy at least the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living, and it does not
grant the people as individuals any concrete rights”).
190
Wiles, supra note 4, at 50 (restating arguments about the difficulty in legally enforcing socioeconomic rights).
191
See infra Part V.B.1.
188
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However, this interpretation contravenes Japan’s legal culture and tradition
of interpreting similar rights consistently to promote harmony and balance
within the legal system.192 Second, the judiciary could weaken the force
with which it protects international treaty rights. Finally, the judiciary could
interpret constitutional rights with greater force.
Interpreting constitutional rights with greater force provides the best
solution. First, in addition to resolving the conflict of laws between the
rights protected in the Showa Constitution and international treaties, stronger
enforcement of constitutional rights alleviates the rift between the lower
courts and the Supreme Court. The lower courts’ previous attempts to apply
this strategy193 demonstrate their preference for stronger constitutional
enforcement as opposed to weakening treaty rights or simply yielding to
interpret the documents with different force. Second, stronger constitutional
enforcement promotes Japan’s legal tradition of harmony among decisions
and governmental branches.
Third, individuals will realize greater
protection in their constitutional and treaty rights. Fourth, this route
supports the desires within the international community.194 Finally,
international treaty provisions can provide the courts guidance when they
interpret vague provisions within the Constitution.
The concrete, negative-rights interpretation provides a relatively
uncontroversial path for the judiciary to enforce constitutional rights with
greater vigor, enabling the courts to oversee the other branches of
government.195 The Supreme Court’s attitude towards Article 25 follows the
Court’s general attitude towards constitutional social rights. Interpreting
Article 25 as a concrete, negative right will generate greater human rights
protections under the Constitution, ameliorating the inconsistent rulings and
providing a map towards resolving the larger issue.
B.

Interpreting Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right Is Practical

The Supreme Court can realistically enforce Article 25 as a concrete,
negative right. First, the Court can maintain its preference for judicial
harmony and balance by applying the “warnings approach”196 and
192

“The Charming Betsy” canon provides a U.S. law analogy, where the United States Supreme
Court ruled that “an act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains.” Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).
193
See Hamano, supra note 54, at 476 (discussing the Fingerprint Case); see also supra notes 111120 and accompanying text (providing details of the case).
194
See infra notes 230-236 and accompanying text.
195
See supra notes 17-22, 121-124 and accompanying text (discussing how courts realistically should
not find it difficult to enforce provisions as concrete, negative rights).
196
See Ford, supra note 12, at 47.
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“constitutional transformation” rather than overtly overruling legislation or
formally amending the Showa Constitution in order to achieve the concrete,
negative-rights analysis.197 Second, the South African Constitutional Court’s
rulings provide a useful model for the Japanese judiciary, consistent with
Japan’s legal culture, through statutes parallel in construction to Japan’s.
The South African Constitutional Court gives a dual interpretation to
constitutional social rights provisions as providing both positive and
negative rights.
1.

The “Warning Approach” and “Constitutional Transformation”
Enable Article 25 Enforcement Consistent with Japan’s Legal Values

The judiciary can use the “warning approach” to minimize conflict
that a concrete, negative-rights interpretation could produce with other
branches of government.
A warning is a judicial notice of
unconstitutionality, directing the Diet or executive to fix the problem by
changing the law or action.198 While most unconstitutional behavior would
result from the executive improperly applying a law, the judiciary, at times,
may have to invalidate a whole act that violates Article 25. In similar
situations, when the judiciary issues a warning of unconstitutionality, the
Diet usually responds quickly, changing the legal provision and avoiding
conflict with the courts.199 The “warning approach” adheres to Japan’s legal
culture, which seeks to achieve balance and harmony when faced with
constitutional conflicts.200 Through this approach the Supreme Court neither
wholly abdicates its responsibility for judicial review nor actually enforces
its reading of the Showa Constitution.201 A successful claim ultimately ends
with improved government action no longer hindering one’s ability to
maintain a minimum standard of living without an opinion that explicitly
overrules the action or policy.
“Constitutional transformation” supports the Supreme Court
recognizing Article 25 as a concrete, negative right. The Court applies
“constitutional transformation” to modernize the Constitution in place of
constitutional amendment. Social and economic conditions now exist to
support Article 25 becoming a stronger, individually enforceable right, true
to the framers’ original intent.202 Reinterpreting Article 25 to recognize its
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id. at 58.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47, 49.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 47.
See infra Part V.C.
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concrete, negative right provides the ideal mechanism that remains
compatible with Japan’s legal culture and system.
2.

The South African Constitutional Court Provides a Model for the
Supreme Court to Interpret Article 25 as a Negative Right

The South African Constitutional Court has effectively adjudicated
constitutional social rights from a negative-rights perspective while still
maintaining respectable deference to the other branches of government.
Two South African rulings provide a useful model for the Supreme Court in
Article 25 rulings.
The structure of South African constitutional rights parallels the
structure of rights within the Showa Constitution. For example, Section 26
of the South African Constitution states, “(1) Everyone has the right to have
access to adequate housing [negative right]. (2) The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realisation of this right [positive right].”203 Section
26 mirrors the language and structure of Article 25. The first subsection
guarantees the right and provides the concrete, negative right. The second
subsection provides the programmatic declaration, placing a duty upon the
State to develop proposals in furtherance of the provision.
The South African Constitutional Court’s ruling in Government of the
Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others204 provides a
lens through which courts can recognize concrete, negative rights within
social rights. The plaintiff, Irene Grootboom, along with 510 children and
390 adults sued when evicted from a squatter settlement and then
inhumanely forced from an informal settlement. Their possessions were
burned and their homes destroyed.205 Plaintiffs claimed the Government
violated Section 26 of the South African Constitution, granting the right to
housing,206 and Section 28 of the South African Constitution, granting
children the right to basic nutrition, shelter, health care services, and social
services.207
The Court began its opinion by identifying the State’s negative
obligation, “to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to
203
S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 26, available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/site/theconstitution/
english.pdf (alterations added). Subsection 3 prohibits arbitrary eviction, but that is irrelevant for this case
analysis.
204
Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR
1169 (CC) (S.Afr.).
205
Id.
206
S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 § 26.
207
Id. § 28.
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adequate housing.”208 The Court articulated the issue before it as whether
the State acted reasonably,209 and ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, it gave
some deference to the legislature.210 While the Court ordered the State to
remedy the failing, it left implementation up to the legislature.211
Recognizing the limitations of enforcing Section 26 as a concrete, positive
right, the Court stated that the rights in question did not entitle “the
respondents to claim shelter or housing immediately upon demand.”212 The
Court, aware that enforcing Section 26 as a positive right proved impractical,
applied the provision’s negative right, assuring it had meaning and
muscle.213
In Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others,214
the Constitutional Court affirmed the existence of negative rights within
social rights, modeling their judicial enforceability.215 The plaintiffs sued,
alleging the State violated their constitutional right to housing after their
residences were sold to recover debt owed to another private party.216
Ruling on the negative rights provision, the Court unanimously held, “at the
very least, any measure which permits a person to be deprived of existing
access to adequate housing limits the rights protected in section 26(1),” and
that the absence of judicial oversight for the forced sale procedure meant the
action violated Section 26.217
The Supreme Court of Japan should adopt the South African
Constitutional Court’s analyses and rulings. Doing so would provide a
natural solution to alleviate harms that occur from an unconstitutional law or
the executive branch unconstitutionally applying a statute causing harm to
individuals such as in the Staple Food Act Case, Asahi, and the Health
Insurance Case.
208

Christiansen, supra note 3, at 366 (quoting Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, ¶ 34).
See Fitzpatrick & Slye, supra note 51, at 677.
210
See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, ¶ 99.
211
Id.
212
Fitzpatrick & Slye, supra note 51, at 673.
213
See Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, ¶¶ 38, 46, 71, 73, 88, 90 (recognizing the limitations of
enforcing the positive right and finding the municipality’s involvement in the evictions breached the
negative constitutional right).
214
Jaftha v Schoeman & Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz & Others 2003 (3) All SA 690 (CC) at 34 (S.
Afr.)
215
See id. Two cases were consolidated because they have similar facts and raise the same issue.
216
Community
Law
Centre,
Case
Brief
of
the
Jaftha
opinion,
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/Socio-Economic-Rights/case-reviews-1/south-african-cases/
(follow “High Court Cases” hyperlink; then follow “Jaftha v Shoeman and Others” hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 17, 2008) (summarizing the Jaftha opinion).
217
Christiansen, supra note 3, at 372 (quoting Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:
In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) ¶ 78 (S. Afr.)).
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Internal and External Pressures Push the Supreme Court to Interpret
Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right

The legal community, the international human rights community, and
current domestic economic conditions pressure Japan for judicial reform.
The attitudes within these communities and the surrounding conditions have
developed and aligned to make this the most opportune time for change.
1.

The Legal Community’s Dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s
Current Constitutional Interpretations Indicates a Desire for Change

The legal community’s dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s
conservative constitutional rights interpretations has brewed for some time.
Interpreting Article 25 as a concrete, negative right could lessen the accruing
sentiments subtlety, avoiding an upsurge.
The Young Lawyers Association (“YLA”) movement demonstrates
the first clamor in the steady progression of rumblings within the legal
community towards the drafters’ original intent behind constitutional rights.
The YLA, founded in 1954, promoted constitutional ideals,218 including
preserving the principle to judicially enforce individual constitutional rights
and strictly implement the Showa Constitution’s original intent.219 The
organization grew in numbers with a large proportion of new judges holding
YLA memberships.220 By 1969, however, a full-scale purge occurred of
YLA members from the bench, and the General Secretariat of the Supreme
Court asked all judges to resign from the YLA.221
That same resistance to the Supreme Court’s conservative rulings
appears today with the increasing conflict between human rights treaties and
constitutional rights. As previously explained, the high courts have started
to handle constitutional and ICCPR claims differently, providing more
oversight and deferring less to the other branches of government.222 The
Illegitimate Child Case223 provides one such example. In 1993, the Tokyo
High Court, indicating a break from the Supreme Court’s deference to the
218
Hamano, supra note 54, at 446. Members of the Young Lawyer’s Association (“YLA”) included
“judges, schooled in postwar democracy, came from different political backgrounds, including socialism,
the left wing of the LDP, and communism.”
219
Id.
220
Id. (reporting that by 1963, the YLA encompassed 140 judges, and about one-third of new
assistant judges who entered the judiciary each year were YLA members).
221
Id. at 447. The Supreme Court stifled the 1968 movement after an article named and accused
YLA member judges of being communists. The Supreme Court distributed copies of the magazine to
courts throughout the country.
222
See id. at 469.
223
See id. at 475 (discussing 1465 HANREI JIHŌ 55 (Tokyo High Ct., June 23, 1993)).
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other governmental branches, ruled that a provision of the Civil Code
violated the Constitution, the ICCPR, and the Children’s Rights Treaty.224
The provision required an intestate share guaranteed by law to an
illegitimate child be one-half of that guaranteed to a legitimate child.225 The
court relied on the ICCPR and the Children’s Rights Treaty, to interpret the
constitutional provision.226 The mid-1990s brought more high courts
following suit,227 and pressure continues to mount from the lower courts to
reconcile ICCPR rights with constitutional rights.
At the same time, Japanese non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) have grown critical of the Supreme Court’s stance.228 NGOs
submitted over 120 counter reports to the Human Rights Committee,
criticizing the Supreme Court’s human rights enforcement and ICCPR
implementation.229
Organizations like the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations and Japanese Civil Liberties Union have expressed similar
concerns.230
Concern also exists within the international community regarding the
Supreme Court’s human rights enforcement. In the 1990s, the United
Nations Human Rights Committee expressed skepticism about Japan’s
claims that courts effectively enforced the ICCPR.231 Organizations that
have issued disparaging reviews include Amnesty International,232 Human
Rights Watch,233 World Organisation Against Torture,234 Asia-Japan
Women’s Resource Center,235 and Madre236 among others.
224

See id.
Id.
226
Id. at 475 n.281.
227
See id. at 475-80 (giving case examples where lower courts ruled accordingly).
228
Id. at 481.
229
Id.
230
Id. at 473.
231
Id. at 470.
232
See generally Amnesty Int’l, Japan: Abusive Punishments in Japanese Prisons, AI Index: ASA
22/004/1998, June 1, 1998, available at http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA220041998?
open&of=ENG-380 (criticizing the court's failure to address violations of prisoners’ rights under the
ICCPR).
233
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OWED JUSTICE: THAI WOMEN TRAFFICKED IN DEBT BONDAGE IN
JAPAN, pt. IX (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/japan/9-response-japan.htm
(explaining the government’s failure to afford redress to women trafficked from Thailand into Japan’s sex
industry despite constitutional, statutory, and international treaty rights against such treatment).
234
See ASIA-JAPAN WOMEN’S RESOURCE CENTER, VIOLATIONS OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN JAPAN:
ALTERNATIVE REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 3, 24, 29 (2007), available
at http://www.omct.org/pdf/UNTB/2007/CAT_38th/CAT_Report_VAW_Japan.pdf.
235
Id.
236
Madre, Practical Implications of International Human Rights Law, http://www.madre.org/
articles/int/hrconv.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (describing wage discrimination case under the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
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Economic Conditions and Public Welfare Support a Forceful
Interpretation of Article 25 as a Concrete, Negative Right

Recent poverty trends combined with the potential of Article 25 to
alleviate poverty make a convincing case for the judiciary to enforce Article
25 as a concrete, negative right. Japan’s poverty levels are increasing at
alarming rates. A country once known for maintaining a strong middle-class
in the face of rapid economic growth now sees more and more individuals
falling into the lower-income brackets.237 Between the mid-1980s and 2000,
the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty increased by five
percentage points.238 Moreover, Japan is the only OECD country to record
such an increase within this time period.239 The economic conditions give a
sense of urgency and make it even more necessary that every branch of the
Japanese government use its full power to ensure all individuals can
maintain that minimum standard of living guaranteed within Article 25.
Article 25 has enormous potential to alleviate these growing economic
problems. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court currently prohibits the
provision from granting any individual redress. As seen in the Staple Food
Act Case, Asahi, and the Health Insurance Case, had the Court interpreted
Article 25 as a concrete, negative right, while applying the reasonableness
standard, the individuals may have escaped the state actions that prevented
them from their pursuit of a minimum standard of living. The Court would
allow Asahi to keep his money, the defendant of the Food Staple Act Case to
acquire more food (or at least avoid prosecution), and the Health Insurance
Case appellant to refrain from paying an insurance premium he could not
afford.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As long as poverty continues to exist, governments have the
responsibility to work towards its eradication. They must act forcefully and
follow through on commitments made to alleviate poverty and ensure
everyone can maintain a minimum standard of living. The three branches of
government must work together and challenge each other to fulfill this
obligation. Japan made a commitment to its people in Article 25 in this
effort to eliminate poverty. The Article has substantial potential, but in
practice, the judiciary refuses to allow the provision to achieve this potential.
237

Mariko Sanchanta, More Families Are Falling into Japan's Poverty Trap, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov.
30, 2006, at Careers Asia.
238
Id.
239
Id.
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Recognition of the concrete, negative right within Article 25 and an
unwavering commitment to enforce it provides an interpretation consistent
with what the drafters originally intended. Such an interpretation of Article
25 harmonizes the Showa Constitution with international treaties and could
provide significant progress for the Japanese people in the crusade to
achieve a country in which everyone truly can maintain that minimum
standard of wholesome and cultured living.

